

human and animal aggression. The author effectively demonstrates the multifarious ways in which Darwin's theories were translated into a wide spectrum of recurring political and social discourse, ranging from issues of peace and war to the relative contribution of nature and nurture, or instinct and learned behaviour. Crook's thesis, that Darwinism bred an influential tradition of non-violence, is, as he rightly notes, hardly congruent with the familiar textbook scenario that *The Origin of Species* unleashed primarily harsh and divisive, conflict-based social doctrines. In this sense Crook's work is an important contribution to recent revisionist scholarship which places the origins of Darwinism in the context of historically specific intellectual and moral paradigms. Peace biology, he contends, found a more congenial following in Britain and America than it did, for example, in Germany, because it conformed more closely to pervasive social and moral values.

The principal strength of his book is the careful, comparative textual analysis that characterizes Crook's treatment of the ideas he examines. Methodologically this is first-rate, old-fashioned, intellectual history, which means it is both readable and comprehensible. On occasions, a parade of lesser-known characters detracts from the narrative flow of argument, but this is a minor concern in a book that adds so much to our understanding of the origins of controversial, modern sociobiological thought.

Richard A. Soloway
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

J. C. D. Clark — *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xviii, 404.

Jonathan Clark's new book, *The Language of Liberty*, is a vast survey of law, religion, English and colonial American notions of sovereignty, and the impetus to rebellion in America. As such it is a complex work, nonetheless notable for a few major themes: the division in English and American understandings of natural and common law; the breakdown (failure to appear) of the Anglican confessional state in the American colonies; the importance of Christian heresy in America for engendering doctrines of violent rebellion; the susceptibility of Dissenting Protestant sects to Christological heresy and therefore to rebellious ideology; and the distance between American rebel rhetorical professions of rights and grievances and the underlying denominational motor of rebellion. It is an impressive agenda of inquiry, and Clark handles each topic with considerable skill. There are some missteps. For example, readers interested in J. P. Greene's critique of Clark's arguments concerning natural and common law should consult Greene's long review of *Language of Liberty* in the June 10, 1994, issue of the *Times Literary Supplement*. The cogency of these criticisms aside, however, there remains a terrible gap in the review literature surrounding Clark's work.

Since the release of *Language of Liberty*, Clark frequently has been accused (or

has faced variants of the accusation) of arguing simply that, after 1760, Anglicans tended to support the royal government of Britain and the colonies while Dissenters increasingly tended to become critics or even rebels. However, this is not at all what Clark says. Instead, he argues that the intellectual roots of politically rebellious Dissent in Britain and America after 1760 delve into Christian heresy and the rejection of the Divine sanction of Christ and His message. To understand rebellion, we must understand the development of English denominationalism and heresy.

In eighteenth-century Britain and her subsidiary societies, political theory usually revolved not around “inalienable rights” but around the legitimacy of sovereigns to rule and defining the composition of “sovereignty”. Only after solving those questions could most eighteenth-century English political theorists move on to posit the rights of subjects. (Why else was John Locke for so long best known as a radical theologian?) After all, the “constitution”, since not digested or explicitly codified, was in part defined by the person of the royal ruler and his relationship with Church, Lords, and Commons. How could one determine the rights of the subject without first sorting out the status and balance of the constitution?

Prior to 1828, an English monarch ruled explicitly as the head of a confessional state, enjoying political power and legitimacy in a relationship with the Anglican Church and Parliament. Clark illustrates how radicalism from the 1760s was increasingly effective in challenging the legitimacy of that confessional state by challenging the authority of the Church. The challenge to the Church was predicated upon a series of challenges to Christian Trinitarian orthodoxy, the root issue being Christ’s actual authority to teach and to ordain an order among those who would follow Him.

Readers who struggle with Clark’s findings would do well to consider the works of John Henry Cardinal Newman, the nineteenth-century Tractarian Anglican priest who eventually converted to Roman Catholicism precisely because he could not unite English political-state theory, as it had developed under the negative and positive influences of the eighteenth-century radical critique, with a theologically intelligible Anglican variant of Christianity. Newman wrote that the legitimate Anglican Church had been driven into the tomes residing in the libraries of eighteenth-century divines, while the practice of Anglican Christianity by the middle 1800s had embraced all sorts of illegitimate innovations, most of which did not honour the Christian duty of obedience to Christ and His Apostles and some of which did not accept the Holy Trinity of God.

For Anglicans of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the situation Newman later diagnosed had always been a problem. The *Book of Common Prayer* (and thus popular understanding of Anglican doctrine) was overtly Trinitarian, while political theories of representation increasingly were predicated upon Dissenting philosophies which rejected the Trinitarian world view and its corollary doctrine of obedience. The eighteenth-century Anglican Church had always been particularly vulnerable to the introduction of such heresy thanks to the manner of the English reformation, to the tides of politics in Britain after 1688, and to the atrophied nature of its hierarchy in America. If, as radicals claimed, the apostolate and thus also the monarchy derived from no more than a social theory or a practice of power, then

why not take the power for oneself? To paraphrase the aphorism as it once ran, “If the bishops cannot teach, the king cannot rule.”

From this argument, this elaboration of the primacy of legitimacy and sovereignty, Clark then proceeds to demonstrate that *popular* radicalism as it actually appeared from the 1760s on could not have done so until men were made to believe that serious flaws existed in the rule of the sovereign and his relationship with Church and Parliament. The perceptions of “flaws” which motivated men in the colonies, Clark shows, had much more to do with religious individualism than with purely legal or materialist individualism. In fact, he demonstrates that to the contemporary mind the latter two forms of individualism made no sense except in light of the former. Radicals in the eighteenth-century Anglophone world, and in America in particular, pointed first to real and imagined infringements of religious conscience, the threat of “popery”, and the supposed presumption of the Anglican episcopacy. In America, the Dissenting Protestant sects had kept active this particular list of fears since the time of the Civil War. The fears were in fact constitutive of the sects. Thus the Radical appeal motivated masses of men to rebellion by appealing to liberties based in popular heresy.

This is Clark’s basic argument, and it is one no serious student will easily dismiss. Despite accusations to the contrary, Clark makes no attempt to exclude the impact of other factors on eighteenth-century Anglophone political theory and practice. He is entirely open to the study of property rights, scientific-secular thought, sociological dynamics of class, and other issues important to American political life. Clark claims, and his research of the last ten years more than substantiates the assertion, that the serious student of Anglophone political development in the eighteenth century cannot understand his subject without understanding Christian political theory in its Trinitarian Anglican variant.

Anyone who doubts that Jonathan Clark has been misunderstood might benefit from a close survey of the critical literature surrounding his work. It is rare to find any reference to Trinitarian theology (and even rarer to find thoughtful ones) among Clark’s critics, despite the fact that the man they hope to refute has placed the concept at the heart of his work. Next, look for an essay on English Dissent and radicalism by A. M. C. Waterman, in Haakonssen, ed., *Enlightenment and Religion*, forthcoming from Cambridge. Professor Waterman can assist us all ably in at least getting the categories of argument right. Perhaps some of the heat of the criticism against Clark would dissipate if the ignorance of his categories of analysis were less.

Kenneth E. Hendrickson, III
Sam Houston State University

Robert H. MacDonald — *Sons of the Empire: The Frontier and the Boy Scout Movement, 1890–1918*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. Pp. viii, 258.

In response to and emerging from that nexus of Edwardian anxieties — impover-