

as the linotype machine — and began following the lead of their American counterparts — such as Jacob Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst — by de-emphasizing serious political discourse. Instead, to achieve mass appeal, newspapers adopted lurid headlines and grisly crime stories, simplified their texts and provided more pictures, and included new sections such as the entertainment page and comic strips. Also, with rising costs, press ownership increasingly fell into the hands of those from the business, industrial, and financial worlds. While these new owners usually found it unnecessary to seek funds from political parties (and thus helped encourage the rise of a less openly partisan press), newspapers grew ever more obsessed with attracting readers and advertisers. By the turn of the century, it was not unusual to find promotional contests eclipsing serious news. Moreover, the new corporate newspaper engaged in buyouts and predatory pricing to drive out competition, not only within the city in which it published, but also in surrounding locales, thus leaving several medium-sized communities with a single tract. As well, the range of opinion within newspapers narrowed. For example, publishers who were increasingly part of the political or business elite, while sometimes criticizing monopolization in particular sectors, never sanctioned sources questioning the basic supremacy of capitalism as a socio-economic system. Some publishers even used their newspapers to promote their run for political office or the enterprises in which they had investments.

Although this study would have benefited from further analysis of the French-Canadian press — to consider, for example, whether the influence of Catholicism or *nationalisme* affected the process and effects of consolidation — *From Politics to Profit* nevertheless remains a well-researched and strongly argued book that conveys its thesis concisely without ever oversimplifying. Sotiron does a good job of integrating pertinent theories from communication and business history and clearly identifies the relevant wider social and economic trends. In explaining why newspapers provided a rather restricted scope of opinion at a time when they had the means to convey to so many people so much information, this book effectively demonstrates the danger of press concentration. Sotiron's work deserves a wide audience, not just for the value of the information it provides about the past, but also for the continuing pertinence of its message for the present.

Jeff Keshen  
University of Ottawa

Claude Beauregard — *Guerre et censure au Canada, 1939–1945*, Sillery (Québec), Septentrion, 1998, 196 p.

At the outset of the Second World War, Ottawa picked up censorship, with its other wartime policies, more or less where it had been dropped a generation earlier in 1918. A small corps of 16 censors began intercepting international telegrams and telephone calls, reading other people's mail, and instructing editors and news directors on what might give aid or comfort to the enemy. By the war's end, postal cen-

sorship alone employed 721 people with a command of 47 different languages. Military secrets ranged from weather forecasts to the armour on the wholly inadequate Valentine tanks manufactured in Montreal for the Russians. Censors also hunted for communications that might undermine civil or military morale.

Penalties were real. Grumbling about being sent back to assault the Gothic Line after only three days' rest cost a soldier his next 90 days' pay. The temptation to suppress anything that shocked or alarmed a censor was powerful and not always resisted. A British correspondent in Halifax who worried about Canada's rapid Americanization faced an unpleasant interview with the RCMP. A pamphlet purportedly expressing André Laurendeau's case for Quebec separatism did not get as far as France.

An historian at the Department of National Defence and a former army officer, Claude Beauregard accepts that soldiers surrender some of their rights when they join up. Even war correspondents could function with armies in the field if they accepted and even embraced their role as propagandists and cheerleaders. Anyone who recalls last spring's reportage from the Kosovo campaign will not be astonished.

Some readers may be more surprised at the extent of wartime censorship. In addition to the letters and messages of a million members of the armed forces, censors routinely read private correspondence of anyone living in the Atlantic provinces and British Columbia. Others pored through letters and messages to and from thousands of designated businesses, associations, and individuals elsewhere in Canada judged to be worth the trouble. According to figures released only in 1984, wartime censors checked out 45,419,358 letters and parcels and intercepted over 134 million cables and telegrams.

Was there a military benefit? Did loose lips sink any ships? Beauregard does not ask. Perhaps there is no answer. Indeed, the major purpose of censorship shifted from denying information to the enemy to providing it to the Canadian government. Centuries before George Gallup, secret police had been eavesdropping and opening mail to provide their employers with timely opinion research. Canada's wartime censors were soon busy doing as much for the King government and, when asked, for their British and American allies.

Were there outraged protests from editors and opposition politicians? Beauregard detected very little. In 1943 an outraged censor, W. J. Edmunston Scott, actually went public over a request — apparently from the British — to monitor the postwar plans of women's organizations. Far from denouncing the government, the *Globe and Mail* criticized the Tory opposition, while the devoutly Liberal *Winnipeg Free Press* accused censors of overstepping their bounds. By taking opposition party leaders slightly into his confidence, King secured their quiescence on this and other occasions. Conceivably, King himself was unaware of the censors' informative role. The age of opinion polling had reached Ottawa almost simultaneously, and the numbers it produced were as beguiling as mimeographed reports from Rimouski or Canso.

Compared to individual citizens, Beauregard insists, major newspapers were relatively immune from wartime censorship. The new chief censors, Wilfred Eggleton and Fulgence Charpentier, were wiser journalists than their 1914–1918 predecessor,

Colonel Ernest J. Chambers, and, on the whole, they worked with shrewder politicians. Like Chambers, the chief censors tried, with considerable success, to make editors and news directors into allies. Nor were government ministers always submissive. Munitions Minister C. D. Howe was determined to publicize Canada's wartime productivity, whatever benefit it might bring to Axis agents, and wartime Canada remained enough of a democracy either to muzzle prominent politicians or to encourage them to tangle with prominent newspaper proprietors.

Montreal's nationalist organ, *Le Devoir*, was a conspicuous beneficiary. Under the management of Georges Pelletier, the paper was as careful as its competitors to avoid breaching military secrecy, but its conspicuous refusal to promote Canada's warlike spirit drove censors wild. Faced with repeated requests to impose the full rigour of the law, King and his Quebec ministers refused to make a martyr. In contrast, it was government ministers who demanded suppression of news when NRMA men mutinied in Terrace, B.C., in 1944, while the censors urged realism. The news would inevitably get out.

By turning his doctoral thesis into a readable book, Claude Beaugard and his publisher have made a useful contribution to an understanding of Canada in the throes of total war. Long after the war, some may expect more indignation, but Beaugard remembers that "there was a war on". Shock that Ottawa collected half a million files on its 11 million subjects will mingle with regret that, by the end of August 1945, they were ashes. What could social historians have learned!

Desmond Morton  
*McGill University*

Éric Bédard — *Chronique d'une insurrection appréhendée : la crise d'Octobre et le milieu universitaire*, Sillery (Québec), Septentrion, 1998, 199 p.

Dans cette étude, tirée d'un mémoire de maîtrise, l'auteur tente de répondre à une question très précise à savoir « était-il raisonnable de penser », comme l'on fait plusieurs politiciens à l'époque, « que les activités felquistes de l'automne 1970 pouvaient entraîner un soulèvement étudiant de grande envergure? » (p. 183). Il aborde là un sujet inédit dans l'historiographie québécoise. En effet, si les politiciens, les forces policières et les témoins de l'époque ont émis leurs points de vue à ce sujet, les chercheurs, pour leur part, ne s'étaient pas encore penchés sur la question. Ceux qui s'intéressaient aux attitudes de la jeunesse étudiante envers les initiatives du Front de libération du Québec devaient se contenter de déclarations partisanses, de suppositions ou de oui-dire. Éric Bédard a donc le mérite de porter un regard critique outillé d'un corpus de sources éclairantes qui nous place sur un terrain analytique plus solide.

Cette étude s'avère des plus intéressante car l'auteur a défini le milieu universitaire au sens large. C'est ainsi qu'il se penche sur les attitudes des étudiants universitaires montréalais francophones et anglophones et qu'il décrit les réactions des professeurs et des administrateurs dans chaque institution universitaire à Montréal y