

Negotiating Nations: Exclusions, Networks, Inclusions An Introduction

DIRK HOERDER*

The concept of nation is usually understood to include all people within the respective boundaries, and the concept of state to treat all equally. From an analytical perspective, however, these concepts are not mutually reinforcing or even complementary, but contradictory. Political practice and power relationships exclude particular groups because of ethno-culture, religion, gender, class, or “race”. Who belongs, struggles for belonging, or is excluded is a matter of negotiation in power relationships. Non-territorial peoples, diasporic peoples, settled groups who became minorities in larger political entities, working-class men and women, and those regarded as socially inferior have gained admission to national belonging and equal rights only late, or are still struggling for inclusion. An international symposium, “Recasting European and Canadian History: National Consciousness, Migration, Multicultural Lives”, brought together scholars from twelve European states and two North American ones to reconsider approaches to migration and the interaction of many cultures in the European past and present. A selection of papers dealing with inclusion in and exclusion from nation-states is presented here.

S’entend habituellement par nation l’ensemble des habitants d’un même territoire et par État l’idée d’un traitement égal pour tous. D’un point de vue analytique, cependant, ces concepts ne se renforcent ni se complètent l’un l’autre : ils sont contradictoires. La politique et les relations de pouvoir excluent les groupes particuliers pour des raisons d’ethno-culture, de religion, de sexe, de classe ou de « race ». Le fait d’appartenir au groupe, de se battre pour en faire partie ou d’en être exclu est tributaire de la négociation à l’intérieur des relations de pouvoir. Les non-territoriaux, les peuples de la diaspora, les groupes établis devenus minorités au sein d’entités

* Dirk Hoerder is professor at the University of Bremen, Germany, and one of the coordinators of the international symposium “Recasting European and Canadian History: National Consciousness, Migration, Multicultural Lives”. I am grateful to Christiane Harzig of the University of Bremen and Adrian Shubert of York University, who were also coordinators of the symposium, for their comments. Thanks to our editorial assistant Annika Lieby who prepared the essays for publication.

politiques plus vastes, les hommes et les femmes de la classe ouvrière et les personnes considérés de statut social inférieur n'ont été admis dans le giron national et n'ont joui de droits égaux que sur le tard s'ils revendiquent pas encore l'inclusion. Un symposium international, intitulé « Recasting European and Canadian History: National Consciousness, Migration, Multicultural Lives », a réunion des universitaires de douze États européens et de deux pays nord-américains pour repenser les approches à la migration et l'interaction des nombreuses cultures de l'Europe d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. Nous vous présentons ci-dessous un choix de communications sur l'inclusion dans les États-nations et l'exclusion de ceux-ci.

NATIONS HAVE BEEN considered to be primordial social units which may neither be left by their members nor expanded to include others. Fifty years ago Canada was said to be a British nation with Quebec as a French enclave. The Quiet Revolution of Quebec's people and the threat of a separatist movement led to a sometimes heated and divisive debate that ended in reconceptualization: the Canadian nation became bicultural and bilingual. Next, other immigrant groups demanded recognition, and the nation became multicultural. Beginning with the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, successive governments and sizeable segments of the public at large, as well as spokespeople of cultural groups, have engaged in a process of reflection and policy change that revised the country's self-understanding from that of two "founding nations" and "other ethnic groups" to a multicultural one. From the perspective of many Europeans, such a redefinition is possible in countries of immigration but not in their own long-settled and assumedly culturally homogeneous states. Taking the reflection on societal identities in Canada as a starting point, an international symposium "Recasting European and Canadian History: National Consciousness, Migration, Multicultural Lives" brought together scholars from twelve European states and two North American ones to reconsider approaches to migration and many-cultured interaction in the European past and present. A selection of papers dealing with inclusion in and exclusion from nation-states is presented here.¹

The concept of nation is usually understood to include all people within the respective boundaries, the concept of state — since the Age of Revolution — to treat all equally. However, political practice and, often, scholars' nation-state approaches exclude particular groups because of ethno-culture, religion, gender, class, or "race". In its nineteenth- and early twentieth-century version, gatekeepers' language suggested inclusion, while they used

¹ The symposium, held at the University of Bremen, Germany, May 18–21, 2000, was organized with support from the Canadian government, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the European Network for Canadian Studies, and the Association for Canadian Studies in German-speaking Countries. For comments on the papers the editors wish to thank Leo Lucassen, University of Amsterdam; David Feldman, University of London; and Angela de Silva, University of Bremen.

their power to define and impose exclusion. Language often prevents analysis of power relationships under which exclusions and inclusions were and are decided. Who belongs, struggles for belonging, or is excluded is a matter of negotiation in power relationships. Several groups, from non-territorial peoples to women, gained admission to national belonging and equal rights only late — or are still struggling.

First, non-territorial peoples, whether they migrated in time immemorial like the Gypsies (or Roma and Sinti) or within memory like the Jews, or lost sovereignty over their territories like the Poles, all vanish from a memory structured by the categories of state and territory. Even many reference works like encyclopedias of history or dictionaries of political science, which are usually organized by states and territories, “dissolve”, for example, the people of Polish culture during the state’s partition between the neighbouring three empires from 1795 to 1918 into “minorities” of Hohenzollern Germany, Habsburg Austria-Hungary, and Romanov Russia. People of non-literate culture like the Gypsies are generally not mentioned at all in such reference works. Only the highly articulate Jewish community with its indigenous scholarship could claim some recognition — provided it was written in the language of a host state and not in Hebrew or Yiddish. Jews’ complex struggle to be included is illustrated by a case study of the Habsburg monarchy and governmental attitudes towards them (Albert Lichtblau). Were Jews a different race or a different creed, or were they German-Austrians of a different faith from the Catholic majority? The post-Enlightenment state’s willingness to include them was countered by anti-Semites, who after 1938 took over the state as a whole. Difficulties of self-definition are discussed by Wim Willems and Leo Lucassen, who argue that “Gypsies” or Roma lack a common historical memory and that evidence for a common historic territory of origin is inconclusive. They discuss self-identity construction and outsiders’ constructions of this group’s identity and argue that the (biblical) concept of “diaspora”, often used in recent publications, needs to be applied with caution. They demonstrate that Rom or itinerants were constructed both as outcasts and as contributing members of societies.

Secondly, diasporic peoples like the Overseas Chinese, religious refugees, or labour migrants are relegated to obscurity under the nation-state approach and have to develop their own institutions and historic memory. Religious and political diasporas often consisted of highly literate migrants — Parsee or Mennonite, Russian revolutionaries before 1917, or intellectuals from Germany after 1933 — and thus could establish historiographic traditions of their own. In contrast, labour diasporas — Jewish, Polish, and Italian workers, African slaves, Chinese or South Asian contract labourers — often lacked either literacy or, under prevailing socio-political and economic power relationships, opportunities to consign their memories to writing. Many of these groups lived in nation-states for extended periods of time, even for generations, but the resident population and its gatekeeper elites

continued to consider them historically not significant, temporarily present, marginal — their impact was made ephemeral.²

Thirdly, some settled groups of a culture different from the majority or from the state-supporting elite group were defined as “minorities” and thus not fully part of their respective nations. The state, supposed to be the neutral arbiter among citizens equal before the law, is in fact controlled by one or several hegemonic cultural groups. Those designated as “minorities” usually have less access to resources and sometimes are culturally oppressed. Such “minorities” are often majorities in the regions they inhabit, but these regions, by historical conjunctions in time or because of power relationships, have become incorporated into other cultures’ “national” territories. Vic Satzewich discusses how Ukrainians, as part of the Tsarist Russian Empire with no state of their own, were not viewed as one European ethnic group but as racial Others after their migration to North America. He places their experience in the nineteenth-century racialization of peripheral Europeans. When spokesmen of self-defined Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic backgrounds held the power to define “race”, they applied this category to the “lesser” whiteness of people from Europe’s peripheries as much as to men and women of other colours. Racializations emerge from power relationships.

Fourthly, even among settled “nations”, working-class men and, fifthly, women of all classes were outside the politically enfranchised population for a century and a quarter after the American and European democratic revolutions. Neither did they achieve equality before the law. Only after 1918 did inclusion increase — in the successor states to the collapsed European empires and in the North American democracies. Workers, like Jews, appropriated aspects of male middle-class “national” cultures to themselves. Depending on the discourse of the period and the relative strength of liberal or exclusionist positions, some members and spokespersons of the less empowered groups joined nationalist and expansionist discourses, as Stefan Berger points out. Sylvia Hahn discusses inclusion and exclusion strategies employed by Habsburg authorities towards internal labour migrants and immigrants.

Women, even at the alleged apogee of nationalism around 1900 and well into the late twentieth century, lost their national-cultural affiliation of birth when marrying men of a different nationality. In the United States and Germany, in fact in “all civilized nations” according to one law commentary, a woman became a member of her husband’s nation and state.³ Gender hierarchies ranked superior to national belonging. To what degree do concepts of

2 Essays on labour diasporas from the international symposium will be included in Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder, and Adrian Shubert, eds., *Diversity in History: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean World to the 20th-Century Postcolonial World* (working title) (New York: Berghahn, forthcoming).

3 Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998); Matthias Lichter, *Die Staatsangehörigkeit nach deutschem und ausländischem Recht*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Heymann, 1955).

monoculturalism have to be reconstructed if women's cultural input is included? The blood-line (*ius sanguinis*) construction of citizenship, in which blood is male, requires recasting or perhaps simply relegation to the dustbin of history. The relation of self-appointed public spokesmen of state and church to common people of the same or other colour of skin, to the other sex, to people of different cultures, and to the personal lives of all of them are explored in the essays by Adele Perry and Franca Iacovetta. Middle-class men's, and perhaps women's, concepts of lives along the lines of Christian morality were imposed as "national values" on Others inside and outside the respective state's boundaries. Societies in the making like "*British Columbia*" — or "First Peoples' Pacific Coast" or "Multicultural Lower Fraser River Valley" — experience lively debates about gender, class, and race in terms of family and society, debates which are neither open-ended nor open to all. Do they show the insecurity of those who cannot accommodate more than one way of life in their minds? Narrow pathways rather than multiple options structure such discourse, which might better be analysed in terms of immature personalities than in terms of political theory. During periods of high immigration and rapid internal socio-economic change, as in the 1950s, the work ethic and traditional, allegedly national, values move to the fore again: newcomers men are expected to take jobs the residents do not like, and newcomers women to learn standards of cleanliness supposedly alien to them. Both sexes are called upon to bring their sex lives into conformity with allegedly superior norms of the receiving society. Only if the guardians of society, including middle-class women in 1950s Canada and other states, exert themselves to the utmost — so they pontificate — can dangers to the constructed "national" social fabric be avoided. Ideological war has to be waged on those not initiated to values described as common to all. Even under barrages of moral-statist-national propaganda, the addressees usually keep their own minds, identities, and cultures.

Sixthly, movements of self-defined respectable members of such truncated nations defined some social groups as without a "stake in society" or morally "deficient", and thus not part of politically enfranchised groups. British governments "shovelled out paupers" and sent "surplus women", defined as those who would not find a husband, to the colonies. The poor were not part of nations; they were considered a burden, labelled "unworthy". Similarly, middle-class norms, in the nineteenth century also propagated by unenfranchised middle-class women, relegated unwed mothers — but not the fathers of their children — into marginal positions below full citizenship. Self-appointed spokespersons reassess the values of constructed nationhood in times of change; they scrutinize the work ethic and supposedly spendthrift ways of working-class men and women. Often low wages are advocated as a means to educate such imperfect members of the nation. Hunger teaches the values of hard work and thrift better than the Bible. What is exemplified by Lori Ginzberg's analysis of social movements in the United States applies as well to Canada and states in Europe.

Such exclusion and the struggles for inclusion, in fact the whole of the debates about nationality in the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, concerned the capitalist Western “democracies” — in which the politically active people (“Demos”) were, at the outset, limited to men of some property and standing. This political theory — though not containing references to colour of skin — was limited to white people, exclusive of “lesser whites”. Those of other colours were colonials elsewhere or laboured under discrimination if migrating to the “democratic” metropolises. Since colonials, by colonizers’ definition, could not govern themselves, some Western nation-building concepts — the British, French, Dutch, and American in particular — extended beyond state boundaries and attempted to impose Western, democratic, Christian, moral, and other principles on “lesser peoples” by administrative missionaries and Christian gatekeepers. Their advice was not always well received, in particular since it internally and externally reduced those allegedly in need of such male advice to inferior status, to the positions of poorly paid labouring, ethnic, and racial classes with further internal gender hierarchies.⁴

A social history of nation-building thus shows the assumed inclusiveness postulated in much of traditional political theory to be a screen that veils unequal power relationships. Our very own languages, said to be an essential aspect of our cultures, as well as the scholarly terminologies derived from them, hide differences that demand analysis and that have been at issue in struggles for enfranchisement and equality since the age of bourgeois “democratic” revolution.

From an analytical perspective, nation and state are not mutually reinforcing or even complementary concepts, but contradictory ones. While a nation, as a cultural group, asserts special group rights against other groups which define themselves as nations, the democratic state — “all human beings are created equal” — is theorized as neutral and thus as treating each and every person as equal regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion, colour of skin, gender, class, or position in the life cycle. Only a logical somersault may equate state and nation — but this conflation of contradictory principles of organization is profitable to the hegemonic group: no cultural group other than the nation could claim special rights given the postulate of equality before the law.

The hegemonic or “national” group, or rather its educated male section, claimed the administrative and policy-making jobs in the state and the jobs in the cultural apparatus — with the exception of primary school teaching, which was often left to women under gendered divisions of labour (unless a military education was pursued from the first grade). The state’s and nation’s salariat became “professional statisticians” inventing a *raison d’état* which

4 Changes of this discourse, as discussed during the international symposium, will be presented in the essays in Christiane Harzig and Danielle Juteau, eds., *The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations* (working title) (New York: Berghahn, forthcoming).

served, among other purposes, to protect their positions and incomes. It also simplified administration because it reduced the multiple interests of the people, the life-strategies of every one of the population, to one single statist interest. Finally, it seemed to incarnate the homogeneity of each and every one before the rule of law, and thus could be depicted and imagined as being in the interest of all. Cleverly, the professional statist called themselves “civil servants”, but, in addition to the logic of the state, invented multiple *raisons d’institutions*.

In contrast to the flawed theories of nation-state, a social history of political systems indicates that dynastic systems were more flexible in some respects, especially where they conceived of themselves as being congeries of subjects connected by obedience to the ruler, rather than as cohesive territorial entities. This changed with the liberal revolutions of the nineteenth century, for which “equality” (as opposed to distinct estates) meant sameness of culture.⁵ As subjects, newcomers could negotiate positions, whether they were Huguenot refugees in Europe, Mennonites in Pennsylvania and British Canada, merchants in the port cities of the Indian Ocean, or small religious groups in the inter-faith societies of the Eastern Mediterranean. The power of a ruler included the right to define the status of particular groups of subjects. Under prevailing gendered education, reformist middle-class men conceptualized the nation-state in the nineteenth century (Miroslav Hroch) as a liberating and equalizing structure. Their views were progressive but reflected the social experience of only one segment of the population. At first, this conceptualization did not purposefully exclude others. Gender hierarchies did appear as “natural”; people of other colours of skin were distant or, if present as visitors, honoured and courted as interesting. In socio-cultural hierarchies, peasants or “folk”, said to be naively candid members of the community, were constructed as inspiration for pure models of the cultural “nation”. This emphasis on the authenticity of rural culture was meant to counter claims of the growing urban working classes that their culture be accepted as a legitimate part of national culture. Labouring members of the nation and members of labour diasporas, however, remained excluded from political participation or faced severe restrictions on voting rights. Only a struggle lasting over decades finally ended in inclusion.⁶

In conclusion, we might use the many exclusions of the past to ask how generic political rights of all may be theorized. They have been and are claimed by those excluded: women, members of the working classes, minorities, the colonized, those with colours of skin other than white. On the other hand, those who upheld the nation-state ideology fought wars in

5 See the essays by Fikret Adanir and Norbert Rehrmann in Harzig *et al.*, eds., *Diversity in History*.

6 Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Dirk Hoerder and Inge Blank, “Ethnic and National Consciousness from the Enlightenment to the 1880s”, in Hoerder, Blank, and Horst Rößler, eds., *Roots of the Transplanted*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press and East European Monographs, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 37–110.

the name of nation, incarcerated dissenters as opponents to the *raison d'état*, annihilated minorities under the banner of common culture. An inclusive theory would change the perspective and start from individual people up, rather than from (state) structures and large cultural entities down. Each and every person, regardless of gender, class, "race", or other characteristics, has claim to equal rights in the polity in which accident of birth has placed him or her or into which she or he migrates. Individual rights exist independent of states, while identities depend on relationships in particular cultural settings. Thus, the nineteenth-century ideology of particularist national cultures as paramount needs to be replaced by the concept of cultural rights as generic human rights. Membership by birth in a cultural group becomes a matter of choice in adolescence. Men and women may leave their group and enter another — a group's gatekeepers may neither prevent exit nor refuse entry. Since cultures are not primordial or genetic, they evolve over time with each exit and entry and with each internal change by group members. Negotiating the interests of all into a (temporary) consensus creates a cultural group, whether nation, an immigrant enclave, a men's circle or women's network, or a religious community. None of those excluded in the past had reason — except for social convention — to accept the inferior or second-class status assigned; nor could any one of those included have claimed special rights under the doctrine of equality. The struggles for inclusion and attempts at exclusion continue in networks of which state and nation comprise only two.

Bibliographic Note

In the last 15 years a growing post-national historiography has begun to reintroduce cultural diversity into the collective memory of European peoples. Some authors take a continent-wide or hemispheric perspective.

Bade, Klaus J. — *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 2000).

Canny, Nicholas, ed. — *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration 1500–1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Hoerder, Dirk, ed. — *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies: The European and North American Working Classes During the Period of Industrialization* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985).

John, Michael, and Oto Luthar, eds. — *Un-Verständnis der Kulturen. Multikulturalismus in Mitteleuropa in historischer Perspektive* (Klagenfurt/Celovec: Hermagoras, 1997).

Panayi, Panikos — *An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2000).

Most authors have followed the emigration, immigration, or migration history of a particular country or territory to counter monocultural simplifications of statewide histories. They either detail the multiple migrations

within, into, and out of a state or analyse historians' roles in the construction of a nation.

- Amburger, Erik — *Fremde und Einheimische im Wirtschafts- und Kulturleben des neuzeitlichen Rußland. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, ed. Klaus Zernack (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1982).
- Bade, Klaus J., ed. — *Deutsche im Ausland. Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1992).
- Brockliss, Laurence, and David Eastwood, eds. — *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c.1750–c.1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).
- Colley, Linda — *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
- Fassmann, Heinz, and Rainer Münz — *Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen* (Vienna: Wissenschaft, Jugend und Volk, 1995).
- Gervereau, Laurent, Pierre Milza, et Émile Temime (sous la direction de) — *Toute la France. Histoire de l'immigration en France au XX^e siècle*, Paris, Bibliothèque de Documentation internationale contemporaine et Somogy Éditions d'Art, 1998.
- Hahn, Hans H., and Peter Kunze, eds. — *Nationale Minderheiten und staatliche Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Akademie, 1999).
- Holmes, Colin — *John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871–1971* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
- Lequin, Yves (sous la direction de) — *La mosaïque France : histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration*, Paris, 1988 (édition révisée, *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France*, Paris, Larousse, 1992).
- Lucassen, Jan, and Rinus Penninx — *Nieuwkomers, Immigranten en hun nakomelingen in Nederland, 1550–1985* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1985); revised English ed., *Newcomers, Immigrants and Their Descendants in the Netherlands 1550–1995* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1997).
- Lunn, Kenneth, ed. — *Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1980).
- Morelli, Anne (sous la direction de) — *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en Belgique de la préhistoire à nos jours*, Bruxelles, EVO/Centre Bruxellois d'Action Interculturelle, 1992.
- Noiriel, Gérard — *Le Creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration XIX^e–XX^e siècles*, Paris, Seuil, 1988; English translation by Geoffroy de Laforcade, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
- Seewann, Gerhard, ed. — *Migration und ihre Auswirkungen. Das Beispiel Ungarn 1918–1995* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997).
- Silverman, Maxim — *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France* (London: Routledge, 1992).