

(who had been scrutinizing morale since 1916) were clear on which part of the population was no longer willing to support the war effort. Potential protesters were more likely to be women than men, working class and urban rather than rural, and uneducated rather than educated. State authorities were not in a position to punish these protesters, as they perceived that actions against families at home would undermine the morale of the men in the trenches even further. Women thus became a subversive and destabilizing threat to the Wilhelmine state under wartime conditions. Their traditional role as procurers of food had become under these circumstances a political issue.

In her final chapter, Daniel returns to the issue of “emancipation” and brilliantly deconstructs it as “a mirror on the wall”, an image rarely used in contemporary women’s historical research. At the same time, she warns of the dangers of retrospective idealization when analysing past forms of protest. Women’s protests and other actions stemming from their need to care for their families helped lay the groundwork for the extremely rapid collapse of the German state in 1918, but Daniel insists that their influence ended with the war, as the organized, mediated, and institutionalized male political forms returned in the re-emergence of political parties and Soldier’s and Worker’s Councils. Female collective action is thus seen as tied both to a particular historical context (the war) and to a long history of female protest related to food acquisition.

The book will be of interest not only to students of twentieth-century German history, but to students of gender and war in modern states in general. While the style is at times a bit turgid and argumentative, the book remains a classic that has changed the conceptual frames in which the relationships between women and war had previously been understood.

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Sarah Fishman, Laura Lee Downs, Ioannis Sinanoglou, Leonard V. Smith, and Robert Zarestsky, eds. — *France at War: Vichy and the Historians*. Oxford: Berg, 2000. Pp. ix, 336.

This book might have been entitled *The Paxtonian Revolution*, for this is the issue addressed by most of the essays therein. The broad outlines of this “revolution” are well known. Prior to 1972 French historians by and large treated the Vichy regime as the reluctant, at times even unwilling, agent of the German occupier. Vichy represented a rupture in French history, a regime supported by few in a nation of 40 million resisters. In 1972 Robert Paxton published his *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, published in translation by Seuil the following year. He argued that the Vichy government took the initiative in collaboration with Nazi Germany, including the most odious forms of collaboration. Vichy was far more than the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards; at least as important were the apolitical technocrats and segments of the dissident Left. He stressed the continuities between Vichy and both the Third

and Fourth Republics and insisted that Vichy enjoyed far more popular support, and the Resistance far less, than traditional wisdom had allowed.

This interpretation represented an unprecedented revision of recent French history, but, as the various essays here attest, it has stood up remarkably well. Philippe Burrin's *La France à l'heure allemande* (1995), by far the best general study since Paxton, very largely retains the conceptual framework he established. That this should be so is all the more impressive given the opening of archives in the last two decades and the wealth of new scholarly studies on Vichy. It is striking that the writings of one North American historian (or perhaps three if we include the important insights of Michael Marrus and Stanley Hoffmann) can so thoroughly dominate the French understanding of such an important part of her history. Indeed, Henry Rousso argues, Paxton has now become a virtual "site of memory", to use the term made famous by Pierre Nora.

To be sure, there was some initial resistance to Paxton. Jean-Pierre Azéma, who recommended Paxton's manuscript for Seuil, reminds us that he was doing so only because Gallimard had already turned it down, allegedly (and ironically) on the advice of Pierre Nora. Early French reviewers dwelled on a handful of (mostly trivial or imaginary) factual errors. At least one senior French scholar, who had previously ignored the requests for help by "a young researcher with a bad accent", rather petulantly complained that Paxton had demonstrated insufficient deference to the French historical establishment. John Sweets has some intriguing observations about the "turf wars" implicit in all this, including a three-way exchange between Paxton, Stanley Hoffmann, and Henri Michel which will sound all too familiar, and therefore delightful, to many North American scholars of modern France.

Still, the fact remains that even in the early years the majority of the reviews of Paxton, professional and popular, were positive. After more than a quarter of a century, one of the most encouraging dimensions of the Paxtonian revolution is the willingness of France and her historians to come to terms openly and honestly with the more sordid aspects of their past. Henry Rousso even wonders if the pendulum has not swung too far. So eager are the younger generation of French historians to indict the crimes of the fathers that they tend to overlook the main criminal: Nazi Germany.

What is new after Paxton? As Denis Peschanski notes, scholars have gradually shifted their focus away from "Vichy France" to "France under Vichy". Pierre Laborie, Philippe Burrin, and Robert Zaretsky, all represented in this collection, have made important contributions to understanding public opinion under Vichy and have nuanced the rather harsh portrait given by Paxton. By their account, popular support for Vichy was always less widespread and evaporated earlier than Paxton had believed. In an important essay, Dominique Veillon reminds us that the line between Vichy and the Resistance was often very fuzzy. Intense hostility to the Germans did not always imply a corresponding antagonism to Vichy's National Revolution: witness the cases of Henri Frenay, Georges Loustau-Lacau, and, notoriously, François Mitterand.

Vichy and the ideologists of the National Revolution eulogized the French peasantry, the solid, hardworking, healthy backbone of the nation juxtaposed against the decadent, café-dwelling urban intellectuals and working class. As H. R. Kedward

demonstrates, however, this was almost the identical image of the peasantry adopted by the Resistance. Both sides believed Jacques Bonhomme to be in their corner, and neither side was beyond denouncing the egotism of a hoarding, black-marketing peasant who failed to live up to an idealized image. Ultimately the Resistance got the better of the debate, if only because the rural resistance in the *maquis* simply could not have functioned without the support of peasants. As for Vichy, it was all very well for an ascetic urban intellectual like Marcel Déat to demand a “leaner” France, but this was not, as Bertrand Gordon notes, a slogan likely to seduce many French peasants.

Vichy also made a conscious appeal to French youth. Many of the non-conformists of the 1930s who, by John Hellman’s account, were so influential in producing the ideas of the National Revolution were also imbued with an obsession with a radical youth culture. For Vichy, the next generation of youth, uncorrupted by the previous regime, represented the hope for a vigorous, purified future, characterized by respect for authority, hard work, and clean living. What it got for its pains, Sarah Fishman demonstrates, was a sharp rise in juvenile delinquency. Whether this reflected the material hardship of the years, political subversion, or simply the fact that running around in zoot suits and listening to jazz was more fun than piously singing *Maréchal, Nous Voilà*, it was bad news for the regime. Interestingly, and building yet again on one of the original insights of Paxton, Fishman suggests that Vichy actually improved on certain aspects of the previous regime’s code of juvenile justice, changes that were preserved by the Fourth Republic. All essays here suggest that almost all of Vichy’s plans for a social counter-revolution failed — women did not return to the home; families did not return to the land. Miranda Pollard argues that the regime’s impotence in such areas may help explain its “war” on abortion and those who facilitated it.

This volume brings together 20 of the most accomplished historians of the Vichy period. All make fresh and original contributions, and the result is a volume that will be indispensable to historians of modern France.

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Andrée Fortin (sous la direction de) — *Produire la culture, produire l’identité?*, Sainte-Foy (Québec), Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2000, 264 p.

Ce livre, publié sur d’importantes problématiques sociales et scientifiques, a été préparé dans le cadre des activités de la Chaire pour le développement de la recherche sur la culture d’expression française en Amérique du Nord (CEFAN) dans sa collection « Culture française d’Amérique ».

Composé des points de vue de 15 auteurs et auteures réunis à l’occasion d’un séminaire de la CEFAN, les textes développent diversement la première phrase de la *Présentation* rédigée par Andrée Fortin qui assume la direction de l’ouvrage : « Si les acteurs sociaux héritent d’une culture, du même mouvement ils la transforment »