

Medical Service in colonial India, is unexplored. A discussion of that relationship could have helped to show the fallacy of the separate spheres paradigm. It was also puzzling that the details about Wrong's sudden death and that of her long-time companion Margaret Read are mentioned more than once but the significance is not explained.

Given the scope of the project, it is understandable that there are a few unresolved questions. For example, how does this subject fit into the study of post-colonialism? Although references are made to post-colonialist theorists Homi Bhabha and Edward Said, their work has not been readily engaged. In addition, given the continuing debates on gender, a clearer expression of how Brouwer is employing the term would be beneficial. This could also help to establish a stronger analytical relationship between gender and "race".

The greatest difficulty with the book is a lack of clear definition of the term "modernity" and its relationship to gender. The lack of definition raises the question: were the women really the modernizers? At times it seems that the modernization of missions was happening regardless of the women's roles. Brouwer tells us that in Korea, as influences from the West were invading, traditional gender roles were redefined and this affected Murray's view. Thus it would seem that Murray was pulled into the process of modernization without actually being responsible for it. The nuances of modernity are not readily apparent. This confusion arises because Brouwer never clearly defines or discusses how she sees modernity and how it relates to gender issues.

In conclusion, while the book would benefit from clearly defined terms and a more even balance between biographical information and analysis, Brouwer's work will benefit historians interested in gender, foreign missions, and professionalization. It is a well written and highly readable book.

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Callum G. Brown — *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. xi, 256.

This book epitomizes some of the achievements and limitations of postmodern historiography. With customary acknowledgement of Michel Foucault, Callum Brown deconstructs modernist axioms of the historiography of British secularization (p. 31), especially the proposition that secularization issued gradually from the philosophical effects of the Enlightenment and the social effects of industrialization (pp. 16–34, 176).

Brown evokes the perennial question of whether history develops in a revolutionary, cataclysmic way or in an evolutionary, cumulative manner. Some historians of industrialization, for example, emphasize its long-range origins; some its sudden appearance; and others combine the two approaches. Brown favours revolutionist historiography. His statistical interpretations contradict the judgements of Victorians and

recent historians that the 1851 Religious Census already identified the irreligion of the British, and especially of working people (pp. 146–148). Mid-nineteenth-century Britons were far more pious than their descendants at the beginning of this millennium. In 2000 fewer than 8 per cent attended Sunday services, less than half married in church, and a third cohabited (p. 8). According to Brown, this secular revolution cannot be traced to the eighteenth century or even to the mid-nineteenth century, when more than half the population worshipped. Despite some slippage during the first half of the twentieth century, the real decline in religious observance began only in the 1960s when women, religion's mainstay, secularized their concerns, in keeping with an almost universally transformed world view (pp. 169–192). “The point is that the complex web of legally and socially accepted rules which governed individual identity in Christian Britain until the 1950s has been swept aside since the 1960s” (p. 8).

Rather than the beginning of religious decline, 1851 signified a revived Evangelical era, going back to the 1830s, when Christians, once again puritan, undertook Britain's moral, spiritual, and social reformation (pp. 35–57, 70). They attacked moral and social evils — gambling and especially drunkenness. According to Brown, “[t]he puritanisation of society reached its key moment in the early 1830s with the advent of the temperance movement” (p. 41). Puritanism and temperance helped the English churches reach their statistical apogée before World War I (pp. 7, 25, 41, 56, 89, 107, 163).

In his own “linguistic turn”, Brown employs literary discourses, “memory”, and oral history (his own specialization) to retell the stories both of religiosity and of secularization. The conclusion of two chapters, one devoted to women as “angels” and the other to men as “heathens”, is that both religious and moral enterprises were especially dependent on women (pp. 58–114). Women worshipped more regularly than men, although servants and working-class wives sometimes had to postpone their church attendance until evening to prepare the beloved Sunday mid-day meal (pp. 145–169).

Personal testimonies reveal that moral crusaders encouraged men to embrace angelic, feminine virtues, disguised as heroic, manly traits (pp. 115–144). Data of religious observance buttress the conclusions of Brown's “linguistic turn” (pp. 145–169). Women's attendance at church and chapel defined success and failure; thus in the 1960s, when women abandoned their foremothers' religiosity for feminism and other current ideologies, the churches suffered cataclysmic decline (pp. 9–10, 156–161, 190). As traditional notions of sobriety and respectability were abandoned, women joined men in espousing “new ethical concerns”: “environmentalism, gender and racial equality, nuclear weapons and power, vegetarianism, the well being of body and mind” (p. 190).

No student of British cultural or social history, especially concerning religion, gender, or temperance, can deny the importance of Brown's observations. Britons in 1851 were more religious than shocked contemporaries realized. Women's contributions to “civilizing” British society in a *laissez-faire*, voluntary age have often been underestimated, together with the central role of temperance in moral crusades. Furthermore, Brown explores the innovative issue of how boys were encultured to discard heathenism for a heroism based on feminine virtues (pp. 103–108).

Yet Brown's postmodernist approach has limitations. It is one thing to deny the structures and concepts of modernist emphases on the rationalism and scientism of western elites; it is another to ignore these emphases among working people who determined to improve themselves. Historians of temperance are largely missing in an otherwise brilliant bibliography. Although a generation old, Brian Harrison's *Drink and the Victorians* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971) must still be consulted, with more recent studies (by Lilian Shiman, David Fahey, and David Gutzke), to understand the special characteristics of the British temperance movement. Largely autonomous and proletarian, early teetotalism defied the metaphysical and social conservatism of puritans and Evangelicals, as well as ascetic Tractarians. Contrasted with moderationists, early working-class teetotalers determined to make themselves sober and anticipated virtual perfection, as they challenged Evangelical and Tractarian doctrines, socially hierarchical and, in a worldly sense, teleologically pessimistic. The Evangelicals, William Wilberforce and Charles Simeon, and the Tractarians, J. H. Newman and Hurrell Froude, were all puritan or ascetic wine tasters. In an existential and practical rather than a theoretical way, teetotalism owed more to rationalists and radicals than to puritans and ascetics.

Typically current, Brown's view of British religion is overly syncretic, correctly identifying similarities among British Christians, but minimizing their differences. By 1900 Anglo-Catholics and Christian Socialists still owed much to ancestral Evangelicalism, despite its *laissez-faire* individualism, but they also celebrated their own contrary incarnational theology and interventionist collectivism.

Brown may be too dedicated to revolutionist historiography. Despite compelling evidence that secularization occurred abruptly, beginning in the 1960s, another reading of the data would also stress the more gradual decline in religious observance, beginning in about 1900 and accelerating 60 years later. Tidal movements gradually led to secularization: greater prosperity, universal education, working-class organizations, labour politics, mass consumerism, and popular entertainment. Robert Currie and his associates in *Churches and Churchgoers* (London: Oxford, 1977) have argued that the "appeal of a religious cult largely presumes the absence of secular opportunities for education and entertainment, the attractions of the Church as a community religion rely very much upon the absence of a satisfactory alternative social structure" (p. 110). Perhaps historians who study secularization, like some experts on the origins of industrialization, can identify long, evolutionary roots for abrupt, revolutionary development.

One of Brown's most unresolved contentions is his statistical deconstruction of the data of the 1851 Religious Census, which he first presented in the 1988 *Urban History Yearbook* (pp. 1–14). Brown questioned conventional conclusions about the greater piety of mid-nineteenth-century rural Britons and the secularization of the urban working class. It is difficult to assess the investigative formulas which he borrowed from sociology, as they are insufficiently described. Brown's understanding of the 1851 Religious Census has not yet transformed recent historiography. Frances Knight included his 1988 article in the bibliography of *The Nineteenth-Century Church and English Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 214); but in her text she did not embrace his revisionist understanding of the 1851

Census (pp. 21–35, *passim*). It remains to be seen how the more noticeable presentation of Brown's thesis in book form will influence historians. This is true of many of his postmodernist assertions, but no historian of culture and society, religion, and temperance can ignore their fundamental implications.

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Colin M. Coates and Cecilia Morgan — *Heroines and History: Representations of Madeleine de Verchères and Laura Secord*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. Pp. xii, 368.

It all began with the petitions: Madeleine de Verchères' 1699 letter describing her defence of the family fort and requesting a small pension from the Minister of the Marine; and James Secord's 1820 plea to Lieutenant-Governor Sir Peregrine Maitland for a pension as recompense for his own service and as a reward for his wife Laura's intrepid trek to warn the British of an impending American attack. In and of themselves, neither of these missives was at all unusual; petitions for financial help to reward service or heroism (real or invented) must have flown around the colonies like chaff, so much so that, as Cecilia Morgan observes wryly, "it would have been surprising had the Secords not tried to barter patriotic services for material rewards" (p. 123). But these two requests for aid stood out from the crowd and had a tremendous impact, if not on the much-impertuned officials who received them, then on the historical memory of the societies that followed in their wake.

As Colin Coates and Cecilia Morgan argue in this fascinating if slightly uneven book, both petitions might well have been forgotten had their subjects been men; it was the gender of the subjects that set them apart from countless other petitioners and made them so useful to the myth-makers who invented and reinvented their stories. Indeed, the gendered nature of both myths is a key theme of the study. Verchères, because she was a woman, was always slightly lower in the firmament of French-Canadian heroes than Dollard des Ormeaux. Nevertheless, she had great utility and could be constructed as an object lesson in civic duty and personal courage by *nationaliste* historians and polemicists looking for heroic figures to symbolize New France's survival in the face of incredible odds. Her cross-dressing was played down, in the printed accounts and in the monument erected to her memory in 1913, to allay fears that the implied upsetting of gender roles was permanent. Rumours of her licentious and shrewish character, however, proved more injurious to her iconic status.

The Secord myth was also deeply gendered. In iconic terms, she existed in the shadow of arguably the greatest male hero of the War of 1812, Sir Isaac Brock, and the presence of her husband in the mythology further guaranteed that Laura was safely domesticated (the addition of the cow to the story was another means to ensure that Secord's story was read in the context of pioneer domesticity). Within these constraints, she emerged as a woman whose story had tremendous didactic value, as a conveyor of Loyalist values, a symbol of latent anti-Americanism, and an