ERIC RICHARDS. — *The Leviathan of Wealth: The Sutherland Fortune in the Industrial Revolution,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973.

"One of the largest inherited fortunes in modern British history" will require more than one monograph. In this first study the author has confined himself to two important aspects of the investment policy of the Sutherlands: Lancashire railways and Highland clearances. The first he calls "transport innovation" and the second the "promotion of economic change in the Scottish Highland." Only in the concluding chapter is detailed mention made of the family's enormous holdings in government bonds. In 1834 its nominal value was £1.1 million, yielding an annual income of £34,000, by far the largest feature of the Sutherlands' portfolio, yet Dr. Richards dismisses it in a couple of paragraphs. Moreover, it is also only in the last few pages of the book that we are told that the family so overspent its income that it was eating into capital at the rate of more than £15,000 a year. The principal cause was conspicuous consumption: lavish building being an important element.

The Sutherland fortune, which by the 1830s produced a gross income of almost £200,000 a year, came into being when George Granville-Leveson-Gower (1758-1833), later first Duke of Sutherland, inherited estates in Staffordshire, Shropshire and Yorkshire as well as the profits (after 1803) of the Duke of Bridgewater's canal and married Elizabeth Gordon, Countess of Sutherland (1765-1839), who brought with her almost a million acres of the Highlands, with Dunrobin Castle as its principal seat. The Bridgewater trust alone between 1803 and 1833 paid the family £2,243,017, a fabulous sum!

Dr. Richards is able to ignore analysis of important aspects of the fortune because the focus of the book is not so much on the family but on James Loch (1780-1855), the family's chief agent from 1812 to 1855, the subject of his 1967 doctoral thesis at the University of Nottingham. What was clearly an acceptable thesis subject is, I believe, wrong for the book. Lock was at the very heart of the railway-canal investments in Lancashire, a role which Richards rightly emphasizes, but Loch's position in Scotland was by comparison never as vital. There all sorts of decisions were made at the local level over which Lock had no direct control. His base was never in Scotland, and he never seems to have had the impact on policy there that he had in Lancashire.

Richards believes that a "managerial revolution changed the face of aristocratic rural economy in the early nineteenth century. This James Loch epitomized" (p. 25). Though Loch held as lofty a view of aristocrats as they did themselves, he was driven as well by a desire to multiply the value of their assets and increase income by means of capital improvements and advanced managerial practices. The evidence found in the book, however, shows him a failure, for he was able only to minimize the excessive spending and wasteful land purchases in Scotland. Capital for the Highlands came from extensive holdings in canals and railways. Such a policy meant the "diversion of capital away from the advancing industrial sector of the British economy to an economically backward area" (p. 37). It was both in economic and social terms an absurd policy with which to be associated, yet Richards' criticism of Loch's acquiescence is muted.

By no means were all of Loch's proposals unrewarding. By instinct he was a supporter of railways, when they were still a highly speculative proposal, and when it was still widely believed they were not a practicable alternative to canals. By stimulating railway construction, the Sutherlands cut into their canal profits, which in the 1820s reached as much as £80,000 annually on an original investment of £350,000. To hedge his bet, Loch felt obliged to recommend heavy investment in canal improvements and in new canals while advocating railway investment. Thus in 1825 the family put £78,000 into canals and £100,000 into the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. The railway investment made it a 20 per cent shareholder and the substantial controlling interest in the enterprise. When the railway opened in September 1830 and immediately proved successful, new railway schemes were advanced but the Sutherlands curiously played no part. Though their shares in the Manchester and Liverpool had appreciated by £100,000, they never again ventured capital in this way, and instead turned to buying up large tracts of marginal land in the Highlands.

The involvement of the Sutherland capital in the controversial Highland clearances is of great interest. Skilfully using earlier work by Gailey, Gillanders, Gray, Handley, Smout and Wheeler, who have added substantially to knowledge of the Highland economy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Dr. Richards presents a lucid sketch of the Highlands. They, he feels, were characterized by "scattered cultivation, low *per capita* incomes, high birth and death rates, poor communications, little capital per head, a high dependence on agriculture, major inequalities in the distribution of income, and a strong attachment to 'traditional' attitudes. Sparcity of resources and geographical isolation, coupled with an ancient social system and a primitive technology, enforced an equilibrium of low-level subsistence. Land-ownership was concentrated in the hands of a few large proprietors who dominated a patriarchal society which was based on the vestiges of a kinship system" (p. 153). With the introduction of capitalistic sheep rearing, which spread rapidly in the 1790s, the economy "moved from one extreme (small-scale, labour-intensive communalism) to the other (large-scale, land-intensive individualism)" (p. 156). Large-scale enterprise brought the proprietors higher rents, while small tenants were replaced by new large holders. In general the "improvers" failed in their plans after 1815, by which time great social havoc had begun to affect the backward Scots. Failure was due largely from the post-war collapse of prices, which affected every quarter of the British Isles. Not only did wool prices tumble generally but the newly-established kelp and linen industries in the Highlands became bankrupt.

It was into this uninviting situation that the Sutherland fortune came to be applied in increasing amounts. The policy was many-faceted. Neighbours were brought out, so that perhaps 600,000 acres were added making their estates in Scotland in all some 1,343,000 acres by the 1860s. Families, who had been tenants for generations, were turned out when their leases fell in, to be replaced by others on much larger holdings for sheep farming. For the displaced former small tenants, new villages were built along the coast. They were encouraged to take up fishing, expand the local coal and salt production and to raise crops on soil more suitable than had been found on their former holdings. The cost was enormous. Between 1811 and 1833 the £437,000 received in rents was ploughed back into improvements, along with an additional £60,000 from England revenue. In the same interval no less than £554,000 was used to purchase land. A further £79,414 went on roads.

Loch, with many others, mistakenly believed that "the process of industrial development, so effectively demonstrated in Lancashire, could be transplanted into virtually any context — given a sufficient supply of capital, labour, initiative and effective communications" (p. 221). His schemes amounted to massive regional economic planning financed privately. It was a disastrous flop. "Rents did not rise sufficiently, sheep farming profits were sluggish and the fishing industry was disappointing" (p. 232). Many former tenants chose to emigrate to Australia, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton; some even went with Selkirk to the inhospitable North-West territories. Often the Sutherlands were called upon to help subsidize this traffic. Retrenchment after the death of the first Duke in 1833 brought no relief to the family's fortune. Severe crop failures, especially of the potato, obliged the family to finance relief for the destitute. From the viewpoint of investment, Loch's policy was a blunder. For Highland society the policy was exceedingly mischievous and unpalatable, even if the conclusions drawn by Dr. Richards are accepted, that "employment and even subsistence opportunities would have been even smaller had the Sutherland policies not been implemented" (p. 288).

In conclusion, though there is much that makes this book essential reading (Lancashire communications and the Highland economy), its biographical emphasis on Loch results in a structure quite meaningless from the viewpoint of the Sutherland fortune. Private fortunes are invariably influenced substantially by the deaths of the heads of the family, but never by the death of an agent, even one as important as Loch. Even Loch's role seems to have diminished after 1833; and as the final chapter unwittingly implies, this unfortunate focus on Loch leaves many "Sutherland" questions untreated. Nevertheless, in view of the abundant family archives, a full treatment of this undoubted Leviathan of Wealth can be achieved; and

Dr. Richards should consider this study merely as volume one. The Sutherland's case is so interesting we ought to be offered volume two hereafter.

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Barbara Graymont. — *The Iroquois in the American Revolution,* Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1972.

The story of the disintegration of the Iroquois Confederacy during the era of the American Revolution is a sad one. It is especially sad because it does not recount how a people harmed themselves by their own policies and practices but rather how they were ruined by the policies and practices of others. When a nation or a people is trapped so that all available choices are potentially bad, the end result of the situation can be nothing but disastrous. This was the predicament in which the Six Nations found themselves during the conflict between those who would hold the eighteenth century British Empire together by force and those who would detach part of that empire, also by force. It is with this story that Professor Graymont's study is concerned.

In her first two chapters the author traces the history of the Iroquois to the eve of the Revolution. One very important point made is that during the Anglo-French wars between 1701 and 1763, most of the Iroquois remained neutral. Only toward the very end of the last war could the British speak with any real truth of their *allies,* the Iroquois. Perhaps it is too much to hope that the brief, cautious presentation of this truth will lay to rest the old myth (still perpetuated by too many historians who ought to know better) that Champlain and his arquebuses back in 1609 had made the Iroquois the enemies of the French forever and ever, amen. The Anglo-Iroquois alliance really came into existence only after the French had been defeated and Canada had been ceded to the British.

This alliance was to be short-lived for no sooner had it been effected than contending forces (this time English colonists and their mother country) would once again cause the Six Nations to seek in neutrality protection against the dire effects of the white man's wars. There were, however, too many factors beyond the control of the Iroquois which militated against their being allowed to pursue such a policy. Internally divided and pressured by both the American and the British, the Confederacy could not maintain its neutrality. As early as September 1775, some Mohawk warriors had fought against the Americans at St. John's, Quebec; by the end of 1777, both sides had made use of allies from the Six Nations; by 1779, the Oneidas and Tuscaroras were basically committed to the Americans, the Mohawks, Cayugas, and Senecas were attached to the British cause, and the Onondagas were divided into neutral, pro-American, and pro-British factions.