

in Germany. However, both the identity and triumph attributed to illiberalism must be disputed. The author identifies illiberalism with monarchism, *Macht* and *Weltpolitik*, fear of social revolution, anti-Socialism, anti-democracy, anti-Semitism, but most of all with nationalism. Nationalism, however, is not necessarily the antithesis of liberalism. Although the author recognizes the nationalism-liberalism partnership of pre-unification days, he does not show clearly why, how and when (if at all) their partnership turned into antagonism. What about monarchism? Why should loyalty to the ruling dynasty be illiberal, whether before or after the 1880s? Liberals in Britain and other monarchies have not found it necessary to become republicans in order to pursue their liberal ideals. Why were *Macht* and *Weltpolitik* more illiberal in Germany than in the United States, Britain or France? When do power politics become illiberal? Are we to assume that the imperialism of these "western" states was more liberal than that of Germany? To identify fear of the masses, fear of social revolution and anti-Socialism with illiberalism is to forget that most nineteenth-century liberals—not only those in Germany—shared these concerns. Nor is the relationship between liberalism and democracy as uncomplicated as Jarausch would have us believe. Can we take it for granted that in the 1880s the majority of liberals in the west favoured granting full democratic rights to all their citizens? Jarausch writes that "many academics abandoned their liberal optimism and viewed the modern age with deep-seated ambivalence" (p. 410). Must a liberal be an optimist? Surely the problems created by industrialization, mass politics and the yellow press were serious enough to warrant apprehension.

Jarausch admits that liberalism declined not only in central Europe but in those societies that came closer to meeting the liberal ideal. Unfortunately the author does not undertake the thorough comparison essential to assessing the role that an (illiberal) university education played in the Nazi seizure of power. Jarausch does not demonstrate that German students were significantly less liberal, more nationalistic, more élitist, more anti-Socialist, or more anti-Semitic than French, British or American students. In the final analysis Jarausch's proof for illiberalism's triumph lies in the triumph of National Socialism. The German historian Nipperdey has, however, demonstrated the shortcomings of the continuity argument. The illiberality of the Nazi period cannot be sufficient proof for the illiberality of Imperial Germany. If an earlier liberalism produced illiberalism, can we assume that pre-1914 academic illiberalism significantly contributed to fascism?

These criticisms of some of Jarausch's "unspoken assumptions" aside, *Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany* is a stimulating, sophisticated and enlightening contribution to German historiography. Jarausch acknowledges the inconsistencies and elusiveness of the rise of academic illiberalism while steadfastly insisting on the validity of his case. He has demonstrated an impressive knowledge of German university life.

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MICHAEL SCHNEIDER—*Die Christlichen Gewerkschaften, 1894-1933*. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1982. Pp. 815.

Michael Schneider's engrossing study of the Christian trade unions in Germany up to 1933 represents an extraordinary accomplishment for a young scholar.

Heavily dependent on family archives, government records and secondary sources, this book is so rich in factual detail that it seems to be right out of the von Rankean tradition of German scholarship. Reading the pages of this monumental work one is continually reminded of Leopold von Ranke's dictum that: "The strict presentation of the facts, contingent and unattractive though they may be, is undoubtedly the supreme law." In this volume, Schneider is all too willing to follow that rule, and as a result, he fails to draw many obvious and critical conclusions from the facts he himself has so adroitly assembled. Since the author has conspicuously shied away from this task, it really becomes the job of the reviewer to do it for him.

Schneider begins his study by proving that the German Socialists never did have an exclusive claim to those ideas that we have come to associate with social democracy. However, instead of offering the workers an Utopian vision of some future society, the Christian trade unions concentrated instead, although Schneider never tells us this directly, on practical goals. Their ideology was a simple one, with the Catholic lay leader Adam Müller and the Lutheran deacon Johann Wichern arguing that social justice had become the primary concern of the newly emerging working class of the late nineteenth century. The Catholic Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler, echoed these sentiments, insisting that what the workers wanted was a rising standard of living within capitalism, not control of society. What these early Christian social thinkers desired was reform, not revolution, along with an emphasis on spiritual values. And that message eventually attracted hundreds of thousands of workers to their inter-confessional movement before 1914.

Schneider, allowing the facts to speak for themselves, next informs us that this combination of secular and religious thinking largely appealed to those outside of the factory system. For those who joined these unions came overwhelmingly from the ranks of printers, bakers, railwaymen, construction workers, miners and telegraphers. After proving this, the author does not say why this was so, although it might be argued that these groups were perhaps among the more traditional elements within working-class society. In any event, membership in these unions did climb to some 350,000 before World War I and past a million after 1918. Inspired evidently by a quieter message, the Christian trade unions often sought to win concessions, not by striking, but by co-operating with management and by engaging in collective bargaining.

As the various local unions associated with this movement organized nationally in 1901, new leadership, noted for its moderation, began to come to the fore. Included among those leaders were Adam Stegerwald, Wilhelm Schack and Johann Giesberts. By instinct, these men were all compromisers most of the time. But, they were equally ideologically oriented and often intransigent on one vital point, a conclusion that Schneider proves with his evidence, but fails to expand upon to any degree. What is self-evident here is that Stegerwald and the others deliberately led their followers away from any real co-operation with the Socialists by rejecting the idea of "trade-union solidarity". What they wanted was a totally independent movement under their jurisdiction, and to get it they continually condemned the Socialist unions for their materialism and radicalism. Given the moderating influence of revisionism upon the Socialists, the potential for an alliance between the two trade-union movements was there, but it never came to pass.

World War I changed the outlook of the German Catholic and Protestant trade unions. At first, they supported the war. Given their long-standing belief in Church and country this seems only natural. However, by the last years of the conflict, the sacrifices being demanded of their workers had become so burdensome that they were growing war-weary. By 1917, their spokesman Stegerwald

was calling for an honourable and immediate peace. The war did more than wear down the workers, it politicized the Christian unions as never before, a critical point that Schneider again fails to bring out adequately. The Christian trade unions after 1918 became active supporters of the Centre Party. Indeed during the post-war period both Stegerwald and Giesberts served as government ministers. What they advocated in their positions was social reform achieved through parliamentary legislation and what they condemned was not the Socialists anymore, but rather the radicalism of the extreme right.

Now, more nationally prominent than ever before and working formally with the Centre Party and informally with the Socialists, the Christian trade unions were better able to push for some of their key recommendations. As befits a socially oriented political movement, they naturally advocated shorter working hours and higher wages. And they talked constantly about a rising standard of living for the workers as the only real avenue in Germany to social peace. Beyond these considerations, they were also advocates of some very vital modern concepts that have come down to our age such as the notion that advantageous wage settlements are best achieved by means of co-operation and the belief that poverty could best be overcome by means of a family economy.

The Christian trade-union movement was crushed in 1933 by the Nazis primarily because of its opposition to Hitler and his extremism. In this sense, the movement had not changed at all, it had always disliked radicalism of either the left or right. Professor Schneider tells this story brilliantly. To do it, he has joined together a series of facts in such an outstanding way that his effort can only be called scientific. But even science eventually depends on explanation and this is exactly what this study needed—judicious conclusions based upon the assembled facts.

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JEAN CHIAMA et JEAN-FRANÇOIS SOULET — *Histoire de la dissidence. Oppositions et révoltes en URSS et dans les démocraties populaires de la mort de Staline à nos jours*. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1982. 501 p.

Que deux historiens osent s'aventurer dans le champ de l'«histoire immédiate», largement investi, pour ce qui est des études soviétiques, par les politologues et les journalistes, voilà qui présente déjà un intérêt. Les auteurs se disent «persuadés [...] que le recours aux méthodes de leur discipline doit contribuer à éclairer d'un jour neuf un phénomène abordé jusqu'ici par d'autres spécialistes et par d'autres biais». Ce phénomène, celui de la dissidence dans l'ensemble du bloc soviétique, Jean Chiamia et Jean-François Soulet veulent l'envisager le plus globalement possible. Une étude de la presse française depuis 1953 leur a montré que les Français sont mal renseignés sur le sujet, ne recevant d'informations que sur les aspects les plus spectaculaires ou encore lors de certaines périodes «de pointe». Ils visent donc à briser l'image de mouvements de contestation sporadiques, à démontrer que la dissidence à l'Est s'exprime de mille et une manières et qu'elle se manifeste de façon continue dans l'ensemble du bloc soviétique depuis la mort de Staline.

Après un inventaire élaboré de toutes les formes de contestation retenues et une réflexion utile sur les matériaux et méthodes pour une histoire de la dissi-