

of European anti-Semitism. The nature of anti-Semitism changed over time, but the ultimate message of this book is that there was more continuity than change. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries cast their anti-Semitism in economic and nationalistic terms, rather than the traditional religious ones. However, neither the upheavals of industrialization nor the conspicuous success of the highly assimilated German Jews sufficiently explains the deep hostility to Jews that was still there to be evoked after long periods of liberalism and spreading tolerance; as Hans-Günter Zmarzlik remarks in his essay on the period 1871-1918, the Jew as an individual had many opportunities, but as a Jew, no friends. Gottfried Schramm makes a convincing argument that the profound hostility of the Church to Judaism, and its continuing anger that a religion with so much in common with Christianity should reject its principal tenets, has so deeply informed all of European culture that its echoes have been strong enough, even in a secularized era, to produce ready acceptance of anti-Semitic calumnies.

Though not all of the contributors would necessarily share Schramm's conclusions, this collection does have a unity of purpose and method. This is, in short, an interesting and valuable book, not only for the German public for which it was written, but also for others seeking a lucid and coherent assessment of the dealings of Christian Europe with its Jews.

RHODA L. FRIEDRICHS
University of British Columbia

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KONRAD H. JARAUSCH—*Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany. The Rise of Academic Illiberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 448.

This book examines German universities and their students during the Second Empire. The author, a recognized expert in the field, focuses on the social restructuring of the German academic community and the reversal of its political outlook in the years between the founding of the German nation-state and World War I. The problem is important for, in the late nineteenth century, German universities were at the height of their influence. Successful emphasis on the research imperative and innovations such as the research institute contributed to unprecedented international prestige. The universities also played an unusually large role in the life of their nation. Entrance into the liberal professions and the upper echelons of government service was dependent upon university training and passing of state examinations normally administered by university professors. For the middle class the university provided upward mobility, that is controlled admission to Germany's élites. The university—even more than the highly respected *Gymnasium*—bestowed the mystique of *Bildung* (cultivation-education). *Bildung* brought prestige and influence. It enabled the educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*) to vie successfully with aristocrats, bankers, traders, and industrialists for leadership within German society. Furthermore, "as the last shared institution of their lifetime" (p. 10), the university significantly influenced the socio-political outlook of its graduates.

According to Jarausch the German university changed perceptibly during the course of the Second Empire. What had once been the bastion of German liberalism became an agency promoting nationalism, neo-conservatism and anti-democracy. Liberalism was deserted and one more door was opened to National

Socialism. Jarausch's theme is the "great reversal from academic liberalism to illiberalism" (p. 404). He begins by exploring the dimensions, dynamics and significance of the enrolment explosion after 1870. He assesses the (changing) social background of students and faculty at the universities of Berlin, Bonn and Marburg and concludes that the dramatic enrolment increase "led to a transition from the traditional elite to a modern middle-class university" (p. 156). Contrary to expectations, middle-class take-over of the universities did not bring in its wake the triumph of middle-class ideology, i.e., liberalism. The greater part of the book seeks to explain the paradox. Jarausch discusses Prussian government policies, influenced as they were by increased enrolments, growing domestic social unrest, and international tensions. He examines the illiberal politics taught at the university by Treitschke and other proponents of statism and *Realpolitik*. The liberal *Bildung* ethos was thus not merely buffeted by factors external to the university but it suffered from internal decay. Many liberals rejected their own creed.

But professors and politicians alone were not responsible for the drift to illiberalism. Jarausch recognizes that students were not inert and passive objects to be moulded exclusively by their elders. In two pathbreaking chapters the author discusses student subculture, the "hidden curriculum" of student organizations—the corps, the *Burschenschaften*, the *Landsmannschaften*, *Turnerschaften*, and the various non-duelling organizations—the political socialization of students by students, and he examines in detail student politics. In his concluding chapter, Jarausch shows how the socio-political attitudes fostered by the universities influenced German politics from 1911 to 1933.

Jarausch's control of secondary literature is impressive. His research and use of quantitative techniques in analyzing the social transformation of the student body and its subculture, are innovative and instructive. The book is well organized and well written, a valuable addition to the literature on modern Germany. And yet it is not without problems. While Jarausch's social analysis breaks new ground, his examination of the ideological change from liberalism to illiberalism offers little that is new.

Jarausch belongs to a school of eminent academics—H. Kohn, L. Krieger, R. Dahrendorf, F. Stern, J. J. Sheehan, K. D. Bracher and others—for whom illiberalism is the key to the German problem, to National Socialism. Had liberalism (goodness, rationality, moderation, wisdom, fairness, tolerance, etc.) been more vital in central Europe, humanity and the Germans would have been saved much suffering. The book is a variation on a familiar theme.

The author postulates that "in the middle of the nineteenth century German academics shared a broadly liberal mentality" (p. 11), but that some fifty years later illiberalism predominated. But how great was the reversal? The reader is given inadequate guidelines for making a judgement. Jarausch does not precisely define pre-1880 liberalism beyond emphasizing Humboldt's idealistic research imperative to search ceaselessly for truth and to adhere to humanistic values. The author assumes but does not prove that an uncompromised liberalism ruled the academic roost. He does not demonstrate that *Rechts-* and *Kulturpolitik* preoccupied political academics in the liberal phase. Already in 1848 and even more so in the following decades, many German liberals supported *Realpolitik*. Certainly a shift away from pre-1848 liberalism took place but Jarausch exaggerates the intensity of the shift. The contrast between the "before" and "after" (the "great reversal") is too stark.

If Jarausch takes liberalism for granted and gives it only a brief hearing, he probes illiberalism with great perseverance in order to demonstrate its triumph

in Germany. However, both the identity and triumph attributed to illiberalism must be disputed. The author identifies illiberalism with monarchism, *Macht* and *Weltpolitik*, fear of social revolution, anti-Socialism, anti-democracy, anti-Semitism, but most of all with nationalism. Nationalism, however, is not necessarily the antithesis of liberalism. Although the author recognizes the nationalism-liberalism partnership of pre-unification days, he does not show clearly why, how and when (if at all) their partnership turned into antagonism. What about monarchism? Why should loyalty to the ruling dynasty be illiberal, whether before or after the 1880s? Liberals in Britain and other monarchies have not found it necessary to become republicans in order to pursue their liberal ideals. Why were *Macht* and *Weltpolitik* more illiberal in Germany than in the United States, Britain or France? When do power politics become illiberal? Are we to assume that the imperialism of these "western" states was more liberal than that of Germany? To identify fear of the masses, fear of social revolution and anti-Socialism with illiberalism is to forget that most nineteenth-century liberals—not only those in Germany—shared these concerns. Nor is the relationship between liberalism and democracy as uncomplicated as Jarausch would have us believe. Can we take it for granted that in the 1880s the majority of liberals in the west favoured granting full democratic rights to all their citizens? Jarausch writes that "many academics abandoned their liberal optimism and viewed the modern age with deep-seated ambivalence" (p. 410). Must a liberal be an optimist? Surely the problems created by industrialization, mass politics and the yellow press were serious enough to warrant apprehension.

Jarausch admits that liberalism declined not only in central Europe but in those societies that came closer to meeting the liberal ideal. Unfortunately the author does not undertake the thorough comparison essential to assessing the role that an (illiberal) university education played in the Nazi seizure of power. Jarausch does not demonstrate that German students were significantly less liberal, more nationalistic, more élitist, more anti-Socialist, or more anti-Semitic than French, British or American students. In the final analysis Jarausch's proof for illiberalism's triumph lies in the triumph of National Socialism. The German historian Nipperdey has, however, demonstrated the shortcomings of the continuity argument. The illiberality of the Nazi period cannot be sufficient proof for the illiberality of Imperial Germany. If an earlier liberalism produced illiberalism, can we assume that pre-1914 academic illiberalism significantly contributed to fascism?

These criticisms of some of Jarausch's "unspoken assumptions" aside, *Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany* is a stimulating, sophisticated and enlightening contribution to German historiography. Jarausch acknowledges the inconsistencies and elusiveness of the rise of academic illiberalism while steadfastly insisting on the validity of his case. He has demonstrated an impressive knowledge of German university life.

Juergen DOERR
St. Thomas University

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MICHAEL SCHNEIDER—*Die Christlichen Gewerkschaften, 1894-1933*. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1982. Pp. 815.

Michael Schneider's engrossing study of the Christian trade unions in Germany up to 1933 represents an extraordinary accomplishment for a young scholar.