

The chapter hints at many possibilities; few are explored in satisfying depth. What, for instance, is the reader to learn from the sketches of a myriad of notions of class borrowed from other scholars' works? Why, having been introduced, are they swept aside, with no reference made to them in subsequent sections of the chapter? The gloss given to the concept of community likewise leaves the reader with little understanding of what Harvey intends to convey by it. Part of the problem for a critical reader is that Harvey is indebted to so many sources, contemporary to his study and modern. He shares none of his own critical assessments of the works, ranging from Zola to Zeldin, on which he relies so completely. The absence of this scholarly apparatus raises questions as to the meaning and value of many of the statements made.

The original essays which seek to expand Marx's writing into a fuller geographical account of urbanization likewise contain the fruits of an impressively wide reading. A great part of this is necessarily within the non-Marxist social sciences. The impression left with this reviewer is that the central view of urbanization has changed little after Harvey's massive translation of established research into a Marxist vocabulary. It may help educate Marxists who have not read the seminal papers; it is unlikely to persuade social scientists that fresh new insights await the adoption of a Marxist viewpoint.

These two volumes bring the fruits of much modern scholarship to bear on Marx's texts. The Paris of which Harvey writes was the Paris of which Marx wrote. The treatment of urbanization contains remarkably few references to recent Marxist writing. The essays offer suggestions whose broad applicability will await their being explored in a wider context.

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Michael R. Marrus — *The Unwanted. European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. xiv, 414.

Michael Marrus's *The Unwanted* is a broad overview of the origins and international impact of European refugees, from Russian Jews in the 1800s to Poles in the 1980s. It makes for interesting, but often disheartening, reading.

Marrus argues that Europeans have only recently perceived refugees as a problem. Before the nineteenth century refugees were few in number, were generally welcomed as additional working hands, and soon either assimilated or died. The political exiles of the nineteenth century were sufficiently few — and sufficiently "respectable" in social origin — that they generally did not seem to constitute a "refugee" problem either. Only when many Jews began fleeing Eastern Europe after 1880, for a mix of economic and political motives, did the numbers become large enough (and identifiable enough) to be perceived as a social category separate from "emigrants" — and to seem a problem.

The first mass "refugee" movements, in the Balkans from 1878 on, were "by-products of the state-building process" (p. 49). As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, it and its successors struggled to mobilize their populations into cohesive groups supportive of state-defined goals. Ethnicity (or religion) became the basis of national identity and loyalty, and non-nationals became suspect. Those who could not or would not assimilate were dispensable.

World War I broadened the scope of state-building and added ideological to nationalistic pressures. Victims of political persecution from Russia joined ethnic minorities driven to or from all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The clash of Turkish and Armenian nationalism had before World War I led to massacres and eventual genocide against the Armenians. After World War I the often violent Turkish and Russian opposition to Armenian self-determination

drove hundreds of thousands of Armenians into exile. By preventing starvation and disease among refugees from Russia and Armenia, international relief efforts created a semi-permanent refugee problem. The League of Nations responded by sponsoring private aid programs under Fridtjof Nansen. Despite increasing opposition to refugees on political and economic grounds, Nansen managed to integrate virtually all of them into some state, most commonly in a France that was desperate for manpower after the losses of World War I. Meanwhile, Greece and Turkey negotiated the first forced population transfers between states, an affront to liberal notions of individual choice.

The post-1925 flood of anti-fascist and, especially, Jewish refugees met a cooler reception. Refugees had occasionally caused friction among states, making them often seem politically unattractive. High unemployment now made them seem an economic burden as well. And because many Central and East European governments were clearly keen to rid themselves of millions of Jews, no country wanted to establish a lenient refugee policy that might stimulate mass expulsions. Marrus recounts the sorry tale of political and popular indifference or opposition to pleas for liberal immigration rules for the persecuted, especially the Jews.

World War II uprooted millions. Marrus discusses the experience of these refugees, including Germans forceably resettled during the war by the Nazis or afterwards by other countries. East-West friction hampered United Nations efforts to deal with the refugees, especially when Western nations refused after 1946 to continue forceably repatriating Eastern Europeans to their native countries.

Marrus closes by describing the post-1947 flight from Eastern Europe and from former European colonies. He points out that the nominally political flight from Eastern Europe seems in many ways merely to continue under a different rubric the economically motivated emigration that began in the late nineteenth century.

Marrus has worked through a considerable number of often obscure sources. Generally well written, his book provides access to material not otherwise easily available. The broad scope of his investigation allows a comparative perspective on a number of issues and enables him to raise a number of analytical problems.

The book's coverage is, however, incomplete. Marrus chooses not to consider the psychological, social, or (except peripherally) economic aspects of the refugees experience. Because he relies virtually entirely on secondary sources in English, French, or German, he has much to say on much-investigated subjects but can say little on other issues (e.g., post-World War II population transfers among the East European states). Marrus also never really summarizes the international impact of refugees. Were they a bane or a boon to countries that lost or received them? To what extent did they cause friction or even conflict among nations in the twentieth century?

Marrus's work is also more descriptive than analytical. He raises a number of important issues without pursuing them. For example, he notes that "refugees" are theoretically victims of persecution but are actually often motivated by economic considerations. Yet he does not discuss how one might distinguish these motives and how these differing motives affect the refugee's flight and reception. Why in fact should someone fleeing politically-based suffering? Is there any difference in the experience or impact of political as opposed to ethnic refugees? The **nationalistic desire** for a homogeneous population often conflicts with economic and political expediency. **Why have twentieth-century Europeans generally considered homogeneity more important?** Conversely, the East Bloc countries have generally very determinedly opposed emigration since the late 1940s or earlier. What mixtures of nationalistic and ideological *amour propre* and economic considerations (brain drain and labor shortages) have made them so sensitive, and why have they occasionally opened their borders (e.g., Czechoslovakia after 1968)?

Liberal notions of individual identity and individual rights seem here to be in fundamental conflict with nationalist and statist conceptions of human definition and status. Why have nationalism and statism won out in Eastern Europe, leading to the expulsion of minorities, while Western Europe countries have, if grudgingly, lived their liberal principles at least partially by accepting fairly substantial numbers of refugees? What role, if any, have liberal ideas played in making people resist

assimilation and in making many countries receptive to minority and refugee demands for protection, succor, and even immigration — indeed, in making refugees “refugees” instead of just subversives, beggars, or emigrants?

“European refugees in the twentieth century” is an ambitious subject. Even if Marrus has not provided the definitive study of this complex problem, he has summarized a great deal of disparate literature and provided a useful and interesting contribution toward an analysis of the refugee experience in Europe.

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Mary Jo Maynes — *Schooling in Western Europe. A Social History*. State University of New York Press, 1985, 177 p.

L'histoire de l'éducation, dans une large perspective sociale, est en pleine mutation depuis une vingtaine d'années. Sous le vocable de « nouvelle histoire sociale » ou dans la filiation de l'École des *Annales*, les mouvements d'alphabétisation puis de scolarisation de l'époque moderne sont remis en contexte. Il s'agit alors non seulement de savoir comment, en deux siècles, les jeunes occidentaux, d'illettrés qu'ils étaient, sont devenus pratiquement tous détenteurs d'un savoir « élémentaire », mais surtout d'analyser les enjeux sociaux que cette importante mutation sous-tend. Tel est le propos de l'auteur Mary Jo Maynes et telle est aussi sa perspective. Précisons, pour ne plus y revenir, que l'accent a été délibérément mis sur l'utilisation d'études et de travaux, pour la plupart britanniques, français et allemands et que le recours aux sources primaires, très modeste, se limite aux données rassemblées par l'auteure dans le cadre de sa thèse de doctorat. Dans un tel sujet, des positions théoriques, voire idéologiques s'affrontent. En simplifiant, on peut identifier deux courants principaux. Le premier, d'essence libérale, insiste sur les deux éléments suivants : d'abord, au plan sociétal, l'alphabétisation et la scolarisation constituent un facteur de progrès, qui est à associer aux phénomènes plus larges du triomphe des libertés démocratiques de la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et de la généralisation du mode de production capitaliste. Au plan individuel, l'acquisition du savoir élémentaire constitue un facteur essentiel de libération et de promotion sociale. Le second courant, d'essence marxiste, tend à insister, d'une part sur le rôle qu'a joué l'école dans l'embrigadement, voire la domestication des classes populaires et d'autre part, par des études empiriques, sur le peu de mobilité sociale générée par la scolarisation massive du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Sans dogmatisme et avec une rigueur exemplaire, l'auteure se rattache plutôt à ce second courant.

Il est particulièrement ardu de mesurer le degré d'alphabétisation des occidentaux à l'époque moderne. Comme le montre bien l'auteure, c'est plutôt en faisant la chasse à un certain nombre d'indices convergents que l'on en vient à cerner d'un peu plus près une réalité qui n'a rien d'uniforme (p. 11). Les mouvements religieux nés de la Réforme et de la Contre-Réforme font appel à des fidèles plus sensibles à l'écrit et reçoivent l'appui, bien timide au départ, certes, de l'imprimerie. Les nouvelles exigences des états, toujours plus avides d'hommes et de deniers de même que le développement des échanges marchands font de plus en plus naître le besoin d'un savoir élémentaire mieux réparti. C'est ainsi que l'on voit apparaître dans les actes écrits des professionnels des signatures dont le nombre croît avec le temps. Est-ce un signe suffisant pour témoigner d'un progrès de l'alphabétisation, se demande l'auteure (p. 12). Oui, répond-elle, car on peut associer la capacité de signer à une habileté au moins minimale à lire (p. 12). Cela étant admis, les études empiriques nous montrent une alphabétisation plus répandue qu'on ne le croyait et surtout, comment s'en étonner, un déséquilibre en faveur des villes, des riches et des hommes. Dans l'ensemble, affirme l'auteure : « il y avait des moyens institutionnels pour pourvoir à l'instruction élémentaire dans les villes et villages de l'Europe occidentale à l'époque moderne » (p. 27). De ce contexte de petites institutions financées