

varsity football rivalries (but then I was a “football-challenged” student). Perhaps because research materials on Mackintosh were scarce, as indicated in the “Note on Sources”, the focus of the book is on Skelton, not Mackintosh. Skelton was Shortt’s colleague and successor at Queen’s; Clark and Mackintosh were Skelton’s students and protégés. As the least developed character in this book, Mackintosh is doomed for the time being to remain a minor one. He emerges by the end of *Rethinking Liberalism* not as an individual, but as one of a tight-knit quartet of male academics who, as I read it, played in a small pond and vigorously promoted each other’s ideas and scholarship about Canada’s economic needs and prospects. Although greatly overshadowed in this book by Skelton and Shortt, Mackintosh seems to me the most sympathetic of the four men, because he truly cared about matters of culture and geography. Ferguson, in the end, does not answer his own question about the respective reputations of Mackintosh and Innis.

Ferguson set a complex, difficult task for himself and has done an admirable job with the available materials. He writes with clarity and intelligence.

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J. L. Granatstein — *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War*. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1993. Pp. xiv, 370.

Why anyone, in the first half of the twentieth century, aspired to high command in the Canadian army is a question that should bedevil historians: surely, a more thankless and unrewarding position could hardly be imagined. In any circumstances, learning the intricacies of command, much less mastering it as an art, is difficult; it was next to impossible in the Canadian context, with the necessity in wartime of marrying domestic and military considerations, while reconciling the fact of an evolving constitutional independence to the reality of military subordination to Great Britain, and contending in peacetime with marginalization to the political fringes. Yet a number of talented professionals, predominantly Protestant Anglo-Saxons from Ontario, chose to pursue careers as professional soldiers. This is their story.

J. L. Granatstein’s *The Generals* has captured, if not the exact battlefield mechanics, then the essence and flavour of what it meant to be a Canadian general in the Second World War. In a country divided by war and perpetually mistrustful of preparing for war — to say Canadians in the interwar period mistrusted the military would imply a degree of thought regarding the services that was non-existent — the Canadian army’s first battles during the war were naturally fought on the home front, continuations of pre-war fights that left the army’s general staff, from whence would spring many senior commanders, scarred and wary. Conventional wisdom tells us that soldiers are continuously fighting the last war. Canada’s most senior commanders — A. G. L. McNaughton and H. D. G. Crerar — never completely escaped either their First World War roots or their interwar skirmishes for position. Both encounters informed the choices and policies made by the Second

World War army leadership — and, most importantly, their performances on the battlefield.

That said, this is a book about the generals, not generalship; it is, in short, a collective biography. The aim is to examine the process that shaped each general: their social background, professional education, experiences, ambitions, and characters. These are addressed in the context of the political and social milieu of the first half of the twentieth century. Sixty-eight men held the rank of Major-General or higher during the war; the author profiles, to lesser or greater degrees, 14 of these men and provides a collective examination of many others in his introductory chapter on the “old army”. He examines the unfortunates who made up the “old brigade”, men of varying levels of ability who nevertheless all paid the price for the government’s interwar neglect of the army. The most prominent receive individual treatment: McNaughton, Crerar, G. G. Simonds, and E. L. M. Burns. Fuller consideration is also given the most successful political (Pope and Stuart) and militia generals (Matthews and Hoffmeister). Granatstein also provides a profile of two senior francophone generals and an explanation as to why there were few who made the senior ranks of command. His selections were guided by the availability of sources as well as the respective importance of the individual. Only at the level of divisional commanders would I argue with the selection, but mainly because I would have liked to see more on men like Vokes and Foster.

Granatstein’s mastery of the political and defence issues that characterized this period informs his analysis of the forces that shaped Canada’s Second World War generals. Of greater importance in shaping his perspective, however, is the reality of the political imperative in Canadian military professionalism — the theoretical niceties of pure professionalism aside. The author’s analytical focus has been a contentious issue among specialists who assert that it has detracted from a more in-depth examination of the campaigns fought by the generals. Inevitably, in examining military professionalism, performance on the battlefield must be addressed, but the author’s aim was clearly to correct the serious imbalance in the few existing studies of Canada’s commanders — to understand the personal and professional context in which these men were making their decisions both on and off the battlefield. In the Canadian case, for good or ill, our generals carried a great deal of political, domestic, and professional baggage, particularly at the level of corps and army commanders. If this was not the case in other armies, and it was in many, it was because the distance between an army commander and his political masters in the British or American army was much greater than in the Canadian army. Despite these constraints on Canada’s senior generals, and they were constraints on their ability to concentrate completely on the battlefield, Granatstein asserts that none ever forgot that they were responsible for the lives of thousands of men. That this responsibility weighed heavily on the shoulders of many is evident; one can hardly question their dedication or belief that they were doing what was best for the men under their command. Whether their best was good enough or not is an issue that arises naturally from such a volume, a difficult question unlikely to be resolved.

To the chagrin of some, Granatstein directly answers this question: “well before

the end of the war, the First Canadian Army of two corps, with three infantry and two armoured divisions ..., was well led, well equipped, and at least as effective as any Allied force of comparable size anywhere" (p. xiii). Few military historians agree with this statement in its entirety. Exceptions to his assertions of quality leadership, equipment, and effectiveness are evident in the army's campaigns throughout Northwest Europe. Indeed, many questions remain unanswered regarding the army leadership's performance in Normandy and the Rhineland. Predominant among them, and perhaps the fairest, is whether or not they had improved significantly by the spring of 1945. This reviewer believes they had; compared to the other Allied armies, the Canadian army proved itself equal to the task at hand. Granatstein does not gloss over the mistakes or flaws of the leadership of the army, although there are cases where he makes too much of personal traits, but the fundamental premise of the book remains the miracle that the under-funded, minuscule, pre-war Canadian army produced good generals at all. Commanders such as Simonds, Hoffmeister, and Matthews emerged during the war as the operational equals of any generals in the Allied, or Axis, armies.

There is no consensus on this issue; it would thus be unfair to expect a book covering so much ground to reflect one. A more in-depth analysis of the generals as operational commanders awaits an author, but this work has surely made that task easier by providing a much-needed overview of the personal and professional character of the Canadian army's commanders, and thus the Canadian army, in the Second World War. *The Generals* should become an important reference work and starting point for any interested in the history of the Canadian army and its leaders.

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Mark Harrison — *Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine, 1859–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 324.

Every year from 1858 onwards the British Parliament received, no doubt with its usual indifference to India, a report on that country's moral and material progress. Such Victorian self-confidence seems sadly misplaced today. Recent research, driven partly by an understandable nationalist desire to seize control of the story, has provided a darker and more complex history of imperialism. The newer history, of course, has its moral agenda, just as the older ones did, but in place of a civilizing mission or a steady progress towards freedom and democracy, it tells of empires, driven by selfish motives — whether profit or emotional satisfaction — thrusting into indigenous society, attempting to control and to mould, but ultimately disrupting and damaging.

Mark Harrison's *Public Health in British India*, which could not have been written even 30 years ago, reflects the growing interest in the "tools of empire".